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Killing Your Chances of Inheriting:
The Problem with the Application of the Slayer
Statute to Cases of Assisted Suicide
MMWenig 2013 Winner - Second Place:
Ryan Konsdorf and Scott Alden Prulhiere, Arizona State University
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether garnering growing public support and empathy, or spawning negative backlash and legal reaction, assisted suicide is a topic that
has been thrust into the limelight in the last few decades.1 While adjudicating the criminality and morality of such an act is beyond the scope
and focus of this paper, the issue’s growing presence is undeniably going
to impact legal doctrine reexamination moving forward. The focus of
this paper is on the effects of assisted suicide with regard to the law of
succession. Namely, our discussion will center on the treatment of
knowing participants in assisted suicide and participants in mercy killings,2 and such a participants’ subsequent legal right to inherit from the
recent decedent.
The law in all states, either by express statute or case law, provides
that a person who murders a testator is not allowed to inherit from the
will of that testator and thereby benefit from his or her own “wrongdoing.” In addition, the Uniform Probate Code provides that one who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent forfeits all benefits relating
to the decedent’s estate.3 Application of this rule focuses most heavily
on the degree or nature of the crime as intentional or felonious, rather
than on any criminal conviction.4 As such, a large problem arises when
a person, through wishes of a testator, assists or participates in the suicide of the testator. Should that person automatically be prohibited
from inheriting from the testator’s estate? Should the act of assisted
1

See infra Part V.B.
For the purposes of this paper and our discussion throughout, the terms assisted
suicide and mercy killing may both be used when referring to the acts which we believe
should not result in an individual being barred under a slayer statute. While we recognize
and appreciate the differences between assisted suicides and mercy killings, a complete
analysis and explanation of the two different yet similar acts is not provided in this paper.
However, we do provide for the circumstantial differences of both acts in our statutory
modification proposals. See infra Part VIII.
3 Unif. Probate Code § 2-803(b) (2010).
4 Id.
2
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suicide really cause the person to forfeit all benefits relating to the decedent’s estate?
This paper will attempt to answer these complex questions and provide a framework for how the slayer statute should apply in cases involving assisted suicide. Section II of this paper will briefly discuss the
increase in cases of assisted suicide and the varying legal and political
treatment of such cases in the United States. Next, Section III will provide a historical background on the origins of the slayer statute and the
framework of the law as it exists today. Section IV of this paper will
then discuss the public policy rationales of the slayer statute and the
true intent behind the application of the rule and the law of succession
generally: trying to effectuate the intent of the testator. Section V will
touch briefly on some specific occurrences of assisted suicide and mercy
killing, while also examining a recent Wisconsin case, which dealt directly with the central inquiry of this paper.
Following that examination, Section VI will summarize some of the
prevailing viewpoints and reactions from various legal commentators on
the subject. Section VII will argue that the slayer statute should not be
automatically and rigidly applied to cases of assisted suicide and mercy
killings because the statute’s main purposes are not similarly reached
under cases of murder and assisted suicide/mercy killing. Finally, Part
VIII will propose modifications to the Uniform Probate Code’s slayer
statute,5 and more specifically Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”)
Section 14-2803.
II. THE TREND

OF INCREASED ASSISTED SUICIDE DISCUSSION
LEGAL AND POLITICAL ARENAS

IN

Historically, society has had a negative view toward suicide and has
even imposed laws that would prevent property from passing to the
heirs of someone who committed suicide.6 Such laws have since been
repealed due to their unfairness. Although negative views toward suicide are still prevalent today, advancements in modern technology have
changed the way society views and deals with death. The medical profession’s ability to sustain life beyond what most would consider a natural end has transformed natural death into a situation where medical
professionals must consciously decide when to withhold treatment.7 The
debate around assisted suicide boils down, in its simplest form, to society’s inability to reach agreement of whether such act is suicide, murder
5

Id.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711-13 (1997).
7 Andrew H. Malcolm, What Medical Science Can’t Seem to Learn: When to Call it
Quits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1990, at E6.
6
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or mercy.8 The issue of physician-assisted suicide first gained publicity
in the 1990’s when Dr. Jack Kevorkian began helping terminally ill patients commit suicide and has continued to be a relevant issue as states
have had to decide how to handle such situations.9
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of an
individual’s right to commit suicide and obtain assistance in doing so in
Washington v. Glucksberg.10 Dr. Harold Glucksberg, along with other
physicians, and terminally ill patients challenged Washington State’s ban
on assisted suicide under the Natural Death Act of 1979.11 Dr. Glucksberg and the other physicians occasionally treated terminally ill patients and claimed they would assist the patients in ending their lives if it
were not for Washington’s ban on assisted suicide.12 The Court held
that the right to physician-assisted suicide was not a fundamental right
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.13 Although the court held that physician assisted suicide was not a fundamental right, the Court recognized
the need for further debate on the topic.14 By allowing the debate to
continue, the Court “did not foreclose the possibility that physician-assisted suicide could be legalized and regulated at the state level.”15
Currently, four states have legalized physician-assisted suicide. In
1994, Oregon passed the Oregon Death With Dignity Act.16 Fourteen
years later, Washington passed the Death With Dignity Act in 2008.17 In
2009, the Supreme Court of Montana held that, under the Montana
Code, the consent of a terminally ill patient to physician-assisted suicide
constituted a statutory defense to homicide.18 More recently, Vermont
passed the Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act allowing physician-assisted suicide.19 In addition, other states such as California,
Maine, New Hampshire, Iowa and Michigan have all attempted to pass
some form of physician assisted suicide measure, although each was ulti8 Kelly Lyn Mitchell, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Survey of the Issues Surrounding Legalization, 74 N.D. L. REV. 341, 354 (1998).
9 See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267
JAMA 2229, 2233 (1992) (Council Report).
10 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
11 Id. at 707-08.
12 Id. at 707.
13 Id. at 728.
14 Id. at 735.
15 Alexandra Dylan Lowe, Facing the Final Exit, 83 A.B.A. J. at 48, 50 (Sept. 1997).
16 See generally OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800 to .995 (West 2007).
17 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245 (2009).
18 See Baxter v. State, 2009 MT 449, ¶ 50, 224 P.3d 1211; see also MONT. CODE.
ANN. § 45-2-211 (2006).
19 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5281 to 5292 (2013).
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mately defeated by a narrow margin.20 Assisted suicide is still expressly
forbidden in many states and can lead to prosecution. Thirty-nine states
have statutes criminalizing the act of assisting in a suicide (regardless of
whether force or duress is used), while other states criminalize the act
through case law.21
As with any topic centering on assisted suicide, there are going to
be commentators on both sides of the debate. Our focus, however, is
not on whether the act itself should or should not be permitted. Rather,
our focus centers on whether the law should act to prohibit someone
who does participate in such an act from inheriting from the decedent in
any manner. The criminal law can and does operate independently to
deal with any possible criminal prosecution for such participation. As
such, our examination of the slayer statute revolves around the necessity, or lack thereof, of the application of the rule with regard to the
decedent’s estate.
III. THE HISTORY

OF THE

SLAYER STATUTE

The slayer statute, in its simplest form, operates to prevent a person
from inheriting from a decedent if that person killed the decedent. Al20 See James Podgers, Matters of Life and Death: Debate Grows Over Euthanasia, 78
A.B.A. J. 60, 61 (1992); Legislative Update, TIMELINES, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 4 (Hemlock
Soc’y, Denver, Co.).
21 ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (2010); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-10-104 (2006 & Supp. 2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 2010 &
Supp. 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-104 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a56 (West 2013 & Supp. 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (West 2010); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 782.08 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (2011); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-31 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006) (current version at 5/12-34.5
(2011)); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5 (LexisNexis 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707A.2
(West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1995 & Supp. 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 216.302 (LexisNexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12 (2007 & Supp. 2013); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Law § 3-102 (West
2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.329a (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215
(West 2009 & Supp. 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 565.023 (West 2012 & Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (2013 &
Supp. 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-307 (LexisNexis 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:4 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (West
2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.30, 125.15 (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2013); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16-04 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3795.02 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 813-15 (West 2002 & Supp. 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3141.3 (West
2004 & Supp. 2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.125(1)(b) (2007 & Supp. 2013); Tit. 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-31090(b) (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216(g)
(2010 & Supp. 2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-622.1 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (2) (West 2009 &
Supp. 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 2005).
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though many states have enacted slayer statutes today, the slayer statute
developed as a common law principle. Courts in the United States first
applied the principle of the slayer statute in the 1889 case of Riggs v.
Palmer.22 In 1880, Francis Palmer made his last will, leaving small portions of his estate to his two daughters, Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Preston,
and the majority of his estate to his grandson, Elmer Palmer.23 Elmer
Palmer was aware of the provisions in his grandfather’s will and knew
that on multiple occasions his grandfather mentioned his intent to
change such provisions.24 To prevent his grandfather from changing the
provisions that were in his favor, Palmer killed his grandfather by
poisoning him.25 Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Preston brought suit challenging
the portion of the will that resulted in Palmer inheriting.26
Under New York law at the time, under no circumstance could a
will be modified once the testator had passed away.27 The purpose of
the law was to “enable testators to dispose of their estates to the objects
of their bounty at death, and to carry into effect their final wishes legally
expressed.”28 Palmer argued that the testator’s will was properly made
and admitted to probate, and because the testator was dead the estate
must pass according to the terms of the will.29 Narrowly interpreting the
law, the New York Supreme Court agreed and dismissed Mrs. Riggs and
Mrs. Preston’s challenge.30 However, the New York Court of Appeals
reversed, using the rationale behind today’s slayer statute to prevent
Palmer from inheriting property from the man he killed.
The Court of Appeals looked to the rationale and intent of the
lawmakers who drafted the law requiring that the donees in a will be
given the property, regardless of the circumstances. The court stated “it
never could have been their intention that a donee who murdered the
testator to make the will operative should have any benefit under it.”31
The court looked to equitable construction, stating that “[i]f there arise
out of them any . . . absurd consequences manifestly contradictory to
common reason, they are with regard to those collateral consequences
void.”32 The court referenced the application of a statute in Bologna
22

Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
Id.
24 Id. at 189.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See id. at 188.
31 Id. at 189.
32 Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES
GLAND IN FOUR BOOKS 91 (1753)).
23

ON THE

LAWS

OF

EN-
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stating “whoever drew blood in the streets should be severely punished,
and yet it was held not to apply to the case of a barber who opened a
vein in the street.”33 The court went on to say
“[A]ll laws, as well as all contracts, may be controlled in their
operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the
common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by his own
fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any
claim upon his own iniquity or to acquire property by his own
crime. These maxims are dictated by public policy, have their
foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes.”34
The court noted that these maxims applied to wills and had been
used to set aside or decree void a will that was procured by fraud or
deception.35
In this case, there was no guarantee that Palmer would outlive the
testator or that the testator would not change his will prior to death.
Palmer made himself an heir by murdering his grandfather, seeking to
take the property as a “fruit[ ] of his crime.”36 The court noted that this
was not a decision to leverage any greater or additional punishment on
Palmer and not to take any property from him, but rather was a decision
preventing him from being rewarded for his crime.37 The court realized
that the rigid application of the law at the time, although enacted with
the intent to carry out the testator’s will, would result in an inequitable
distribution of property. That is, the testator would not likely distribute
his estate to his murderer. In addressing this issue, the court laid out the
framework and rationale for the modern day slayer statue.
IV. THE INTENT

AND

PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND

THE

SLAYER STATUTE

Some version of the slayer statute has been adopted in 48 states and
the District of Columbia.38 The remaining two states, Massachusetts
33

Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 190.
35 See id. (citing Allen v. M’Pherson, [1847-1848] 1 H.L. 191 (appeal taken from
Eng.); Harrison’s Appeal, 48 Conn. 202 (1880)).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See ALA. CODE § 43-8-253 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803 (2012); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2803 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-204 (West 2012); CAL. PROB.
CODE §§ 250-258 (West 2002 & Supp 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-803 (West
2011 & Supp. 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-447 (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, § 2322 (West 2006); D.C. CODE § 19-320 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West
2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-5 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-803 (2007); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 15-2-803 (2009); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-6 (West 2007 & Supp.
2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-12.1 (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.535 (West
34

Winter 2013] KILLING YOUR CHANCES OF INHERITING

405

and New Hampshire, do not have a slayer statute, but rather rely on
case law to bar the slayer from inheriting.39 Although the exact motivation behind the slayer statute may vary from state to state, the central
focus of the law of succession remains, along with the two key principles
of the slayer statute, which undoubtedly play a role in its adoption—
equity and morality.
A. The Underlying Focus: Intent of the Testator
The main underlying principle of the law of succession is to effectuate the intent of the testator in the distribution of the testator’s estate.40
It is important to not lose sight of this principle when enacting and interpreting laws. In situations of murder, it is logical to assume that the
victim would not want the murderer to inherit. Thus, the slayer statute
is an attempt to carry out the testator’s intent, through the realization
that the testator would likely change their will to disinherit the person
that killed them. Without the opportunity to change their will, the
slayer statue essentially makes the changes the testator would likely
have made if given the opportunity. While this makes logical sense in
situations of traditional murder, the slayer statute may actually under2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 381.280 (West 2012); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 946 (2000 & Supp. 2013); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-803 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2803 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-803 (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-25
(West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.054 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813
(2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2354 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41B.200 (West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:7-5 to 7-7 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-2-803 (West 2006); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney 2012);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -12 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (2010); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (West 2013);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.455-.555 (West 2007); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 88018815 (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 33-1.1-1 to 33-1.1-16 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 622-803 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-803 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-106
(2007); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41(d) (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803 (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2013) (original version at UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-804 (LexisNexis
1993 & Supp. 2013)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 551(6) (West 2007) (repealed by VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 314 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-401 to 55-415 (West 2008) (repealed by VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-2501 to 64.2-2511 (West 2012)); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 11.84.010 to 11.84.900 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-2
(West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 852.01(2m), 854.14 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 2-14-101 (2013).
39 See Slocum v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 139 N.E. 816, 816 (Mass. 1923); cf. Kelley v.
New Hampshire, 196 A.2d 68, 69 (N.H. 1963) (indicating this is a case of first impression).
40 In re Estate of Shumway, 3 P.3d 977, 984 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); In re Estate of
Kirkes, 273 P.3d 664, 667 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012); In re Estate of Johnson, 811 P.2d 360, 362
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); In re Estate of Smith, 580 P.2d 754, 756 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
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mine the main principle of the law of succession, if rigidly applied in
cases of mercy killings or assisted suicides.
B. Equity
One of the primary rationales supporting the slayer statute is the
principle that no man can take advantage of his own wrong. Without
such a policy, people would benefit from their wrongful acts, essentially
serving as an incentive to commit such wrongful acts. The policy serves
as a punishment for, and a deterrent to, people committing acts that are
harmful to society. The slayer statute serves to prevent unjust enrichment by erasing any financial incentive one may have in taking the life
of someone they will inherit from. The court in Riggs v. Palmer applied
the equity theory and concluded that property law should not benefit a
murderer when such laws were “passed for the orderly, peaceable, and
just devolution of property.”41 This supports the principle that “no system of jurisprudence can with reason include amongst the rights which it
enforces rights directly resulting to the person asserting them from the
crime of that person.”42 The slayer statute does not take into account
the slayer’s intent or motivation behind the killing. Regardless of
whether or not financial gain was a motivating factor in the killer’s
mind, the slayer statute will apply.
C. Morality
As with any issue relating to the life and death and the sanctity of
life, morality plays a role in the development and application of the
slayer statute. Most cultures believe killing to be immoral regardless of
the motivation because of the sanctity of life.43 Mercy killings and assisted suicides create tension because society prioritizes the sanctity and
sacredness of human life above everything else. This hierarchy leads
many people to believe that killing of any kind, regardless of motive or
situation, violates this morality principle. The medical profession has encountered this tension as demand for mercy killings have increased.
Medical professionals often take oaths upon entering practice, almost all
of which reference their duty to the preservation of life.44 The slayer
statute acts as a deterrent and attempts to preserve life and maintain
41

Palmer, 22 N.E. at 190.
Cleaver v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass’n, [1891] 1 Q.B. 147 (C.A.) at 156 (Eng.).
43 See Joseph Boyle, Sanctity of Life and Suicide: Tensions and Developments Within
Common Morality, in 35 SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY
THEMES 221, 221 (Baruch A. Brody ed., 1989).
44 HELGA KUHSE, THE SANCTITY-OF-LIFE DOCTRINE IN MEDICINE: A CRITIQUE 6-7
(Clarendon Press, 1987); see RUTH MACKLIN, MORTAL CHOICES: BIOETHICS IN TODAY’S
WORLD 5-9 (Pantheon Books, 1987).
42
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morality by removing any financial incentives one may have in assisting
in the suicide or killing of another.
V. OCCURRENCES

ISSUE: ASSISTED SUICIDE
ITS TREATMENT

OF THE

AND

A. Introduction
The diverse social, political, and even legal reactions and subsequent treatment to the growing trend of assisted suicide has created a
state of flux. As with any issue concerning life and death, there will
never likely be full-fledged support on either side of the movement.
However, the reality is, issues associated with assisted suicide and mercy
killings continue to emerge within various political and legal arenas. As
these issues continue to evolve within such arenas, the ability to fit them
neatly within already-existing legal constraints severely diminishes.
This section will summarize several seminal cases involving assisted
suicide and mercy killings, highlighting, in particular, the vast differences in both the legal and moral culpability between the actors in such
cases and a “killer” in the traditional sense. This section will then analyze a Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision that faced this issue headon.
B. Assisted Suicide in the News
The tragic 1920 Michigan case of People v. Roberts is one of the
more well known assisted suicide cases. Roberts involved a husband who
provided his physically disabled wife, who suffered from multiple sclerosis and was in great pain, with poison in order to kill herself.45 Following unsuccessful attempts to commit suicide herself, Roberts’ wife asked
him to provide her with poison.46 Roberts placed a cup of poison within
her reach, knowing that she would likely drink the poison voluntarily to
commit suicide and relieve herself of her pain.47 Roberts argued that
since suicide was not a crime in Michigan, it was not a crime to help
someone commit suicide.48 Roberts was convicted of first-degree murder even though he did not force his wife to ingest the poison.49
Perhaps the most famous instance of assisted suicide covered by the
media was the case of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, which thrust the issue of
45 People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 691 (Mich. 1920), overruled by People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 691.
48 Id. at 692.
49 Id. at 690, 693.
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assisted suicide to the national headlines.50 By the mid 1990’s, Dr.
Kevorkian’s name was synonymous with assisted suicide. Dr. Kevorkian created a “suicide device” that injected chemicals into the patient’s
veins.51 The first chemical caused the patient to become unconscious,
while the second chemical would stop the patient’s heart.52 Janet Adkins was a woman with Alzheimer’s disease.53 At her request, Dr.
Kevorkian attached Adkins to the “suicide device” and instructed her
on how to operate it.54 Adkins subsequently pushed the button and
passed away five minutes later.55 Adkin’s last words to Dr. Kevorkian
were “Thank you.”56 Dr. Kevorkian was charged with first-degree murder, but the chargers were ultimately dropped.57 Prosecutors then
sought and were granted an injunction, barring Dr. Kevorkian from assisting others in committing suicide.58
More recently was the tragic story of the Sun City couple, George
and Ginger Saunders. George met Ginger in 1946 when she was 15 years
old.59 In 1969 Ginger was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and shortly
after was confined to a wheel chair.60 George, a loving husband, served
as Ginger’s sole caregiver for 40 years, catering to her daily needs. In
this time, Ginger’s health continued to deteriorate and she eventually
contracted gangrene. Knowing that she would likely wind up in a nursing home, Ginger pleaded with George to end her suffering. George
repeatedly told her that he couldn’t do it, but she continued to beg.61
Ginger repeatedly said, “Do it. Do it. Do it.”62 Eventually, George shot
and killed Ginger. George was charged with first-degree murder but
later plead guilty to manslaughter. Prosecutors did not ask the judge to
sentence George to prison.63 Judge John Ditsworth sentenced George
50 Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 803,
833 (1993).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Brian Skoloff, George Sanders Gets Probation for ‘Mercy Killing’ Wife, Virginia
Sanders, THE HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 29, 2010, 7:29 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/29/george-sanders-virginia-sanders-mercykilling_n_2978179.html.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
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to two years unsupervised probation in a sentence that Ditsworth said
“tempers justice with mercy.”64
C. Tackling the Issue: In re Schunk
While various news media outlets have covered incredibly tragic
stories and circumstances of many instances like the ones previously discussed, it has taken much longer for a court to reach the proverbial next
step of deciding whether participants in assisted suicide and mercy killings, regardless of criminal liability, should be allowed to inherit from
the decedent. However, in 2008, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals took
that next step.
The court recently held that a mother and daughter who assisted in
the suicide of the husband/father did not commit an “unlawful and intentional killing,” and thus were not barred from inheriting under his
will.65 In coming to this conclusion, the court agreed with the circuit
court’s finding that the “unlawful and intentional killing” requirement
of the Wisconsin Slayer Statute does not include assisting another to
commit suicide.66
In this case, Edward Schunk was terminally ill with non-Hodgkin’s
lymphoma and died from a self-inflicted shotgun wound.67 His wife,
Linda, and his daughter, Megan, were two of several beneficiaries of
Edward’s will.68 Stipulated “factual submissions show[ed] that Edward
was hospitalized several days before his death [and] on the day of his
death his doctor allowed him to leave on a one-day pass to see his home
and his dogs” once more.69 Accordingly, Linda and Megan brought him
home from the hospital.70 That is where the factual clarity becomes
convoluted. According to one of Edward’s older daughters, and four of
her other siblings, Linda and Megan drove Edward “to a cabin on their
property, helped him inside, gave him a loaded shotgun, and left.”71
Linda and Megan, rather, asserted that Edward drove himself to the
cabin, and that they did not know of his intention to kill himself.72 Edward was found dead from a single gunshot wound to the chest later that
day.73
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
In re Estate of Schunk, 760 N.W.2d 446, 446 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
Schunk, 760 N.W.2d at 450; see also Wis. Stat. Ann. § 854.14 (West 2002).
Id. at 446.
Id. at 447.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Court of Appeals, like the Circuit Court below, assumed for
the sake of the motion for summary judgment that the factual assertion
of Edward’s other children was correct: that Linda and Megan assisted
Edward in committing suicide.74 Even assuming the actions of Linda
and Megan helped to bring about Edward’s death, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the phrase “unlawful and intentional killing” does not
plainly encompass the conduct of and actions taken by Linda and
Megan.75 The court chose to look at the plain meanings of the words
and found that the first definition of the word “kill” is “to deprive of
life.”76 Additionally, the court noted that “to commit suicide” is defined
as “to put (oneself) to death: kill.”77 As such, the court reasoned that
“[a] person who assists another in voluntarily and intentionally taking
his or her own life is plainly not depriving the other of life.”78 Edward
deprived himself of life by shooting himself with the shotgun. The court
disagreed with the argument that because Linda and Megan provided
the means with which Edward killed himself they were agents of his
death and thus “killers,” and stated that “killer” is not commonly understood to mean the person who provides the means that enable another
to kill.79
The court even went as far as to realize that “[a] testator might, for
example, contemplate that an intended beneficiary might kill the testator in an act of euthanasia . . . and the testator might want this to happen.”80 Simply, the court concluded that “unlawful and intentional
killing” does not include assisting another to commit suicide.81
By making a conscious decision to exclude the act of assisted suicide from their legal definition of “unlawful and intentional killing,” the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals not only recognized the factual incongruences between the two acts, but even further recognized that the wake
left behind from the implementation of these acts differs greatly as well.
This proactive recognition symbolizes a stance against the rigid and automatic application of the slayer rule and provides an example for how
future courts can empower themselves to effectuate the true purpose of
the law of succession and attempt to ensure to the best of their abilities
the true intent of the testator.
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.

at 448.

at
at
at
at

448-49.
449.
449-50.
450.

Winter 2013] KILLING YOUR CHANCES OF INHERITING

VI. THE COURT

OF

411

PUBLIC OPINION

Just as the treatment of assisted suicide in political and legal arenas
differs vastly, the public reaction and viewpoints amongst legal and social commentators is similarly diverse.
The former chairman of the elder law section of the New Jersey
State Bar Association suggests that slayer statutes need further examination in the realm of assisted suicide, especially when consideration is
given to the many degenerative diseases inflicting so many people today.82 As he states, “[p]robate law and the law of succession need not
follow the criminal law.”83 While the criminal law acts to punish the
wrongdoing, the law of succession is centrally focused on determining
and putting into effect the intent of the testator. And if the death is
truly the result of an assisted suicide, the intent of the testator would
likely be to benefit the assisting individual, rather than punishing
them.84
Another commentator agrees, stating that “courts should be given
the freedom to follow the decedent’s intent and allow the slayer to benefit,”85 with certain safeguards.86 As he states plainly, “the policy of
preventing a murderer from benefitting from her act should not apply to
mercy killing.”87 The policies underlying the prevailing yet rigid slayer
statute are unpersuasive in the context of assisted suicide.88 In his mind,
and in the minds of many others, “[k]illing out of mercy is not a ‘wrongful act.’”89 There is no injury to either society or the decedent, since
“those who beg to be killed in mercy do so to obtain relief,” and therefore the “equitable policy against killing lacks force . . . when considered
in the context of mercy killings.”90
82 Arne Siegel, Letter to the Editor, Don’t Make Me Choose Between Life and
Death: Slayer’s Rule, N.Y. T I M E S , June 13, 1994, available at http://
www.nytimes.com1994/06/13/opinion/l-don-t-make-me-choose-between-life-and-deathslayer-s-rule-385239.html.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Kent S. Berk, Comments, Mercy Killing and the Slayer Rule: Should the Legislatures Change Something? 67 TUL. L. REV. 485, 506 (1993).
86 Id. at 506–07 (“[T]o prevent murderers who act out of greed, hatred, or prospective personal gain from benefitting under the pretense of mercy killing.”).
87 Id. at 486.
88 Id. at 495 (advocating adherence to the decedent’s intent by “allowing the mercy
killer to take under the decedent’s will or otherwise”).
89 Id. at 496 (“People who aid in a mercy killing tend to share a close relationship
with the decedent and therefore act out of love, affection, and a desire to see their loved
one freed from suffering. They are not driven by a desire to accelerate or ensure their
inheritance.” (footnotes omitted)).
90 Id.

412

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:399

However, not everyone believes that assisted suicide should operate outside the reach of the slayer statute. At least one public commentator believes that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals erred in its analysis
and conclusions regarding the right of Linda and Megan Schunk to inherit.91 Specifically, this commentator argues that the court’s decision
“frustrated the purpose of the slayer [statute] by allowing individuals
who commit assisted suicide to inherit.”92 While analyzing the court’s
opinion, he advocates that the legal definition of “to kill” should have a
much broader definition than the one given to the phrase by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.93 He believes that the act of assisted suicide is
indeed encompassed within the notion of Wisconsin’s Slayer Statute and
that the proper legal definition of “to kill” includes acts that are a substantial factor in causing the death of an individual, and not merely direct causes of death like the Wisconsin Court of Appeals put forth.94 In
short, he argues that culpability in Wisconsin is not limited only to acts
that are the direct cause of death, and thus Wisconsin’s Slayer Statute
should punish cases of assisted suicide and their participants as the state
punishes crimes of accomplice liability and felony murder.95
Yet, what this definitional-focused viewpoint fails to take into account is that the greater emphasis should always be placed on trying to
effectuate the central purpose behind an entire body of law, rather than
trying to pigeonhole incongruent actions like murder and assisted suicide into one neat, coffin-shaped box . The commentator, cited above,
states that placing assisted suicide outside the scope of the law’s reach
“frustrated the purpose of the slayer rule by allowing individuals who
commit assisted suicide to inherit.”96 But this argument fails to see the
forest through the trees. It is simply illogical to argue that in order to
maintain the limited purpose of a single rule, the larger body of law
within which the single rule operates needs to be tossed aside altogether. For if one chooses to lump assisted suicide within the ill-fitting
confines of the slayer statute, the broader and more established main
goal of the law of succession of attempting to effectuate the true intent
of the testator, becomes utterly forgotten. Simply put, the application of
the slayer statute to cases of assisted suicide does more harm to the
long-standing aim of the law of succession than it could ever offer in
beneficial simplicity.
91 Matthew Barry Reisig, Comment, O to A, For Helping Kill O: Wisconsin’s Decision Not to Bar Inheritance to Individuals Who Assist A Decedent in Suicide, 17 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 785, 787 (2009).
92 Id. at 787.
93 Id. at 793-95.
94 Id. at 795.
95 See id. at 795-800.
96 Id. at 787.
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VII. THE SLAYER STATUTE SHOULD NOT BE RIGIDLY AND
AUTOMATICALLY APPLIED TO CASES OF ASSISTED SUICIDE
The slayer statute should not automatically be applied to cases of
assisted suicide and likewise automatically bar an assisting or knowing
participant from inheriting, because the two main areas of focus and
emphasis of the slayer statute are not similarly affected by intentional
and felonious murders and cases of assisted suicide.
First, it is important to remember that the crux of the law of transfers and wills is to effectuate the intent of the testator to the best of the
law’s ability. One of the two main purposes behind the slayer statute is
the presumption that a deceased testator would most likely not wish or
intend for the murderous actor to continue to inherit, either by intestacy
or by will. This is a logical presumption and one that would seem to
apply in most, if not all, cases of a murdered testator. However, this
presumption does not hold weight when the factual circumstances of a
particular case shift from that of a murder to that of assisted suicide.
Unlike a murder scenario where the decedent had no intention or
wish to cease living and the alleged guilty actor took matters into his/her
own hands, a case of assisted suicide presumably encompasses a factual
scenario whereby two or more individuals participate in a set of events
designed to carry out the intentions and wishes of the decedent to
achieve an end, admittedly a tragically sad end, that was welcomed by
the decedent. In such a scenario, the surviving participants would likely
be looked upon with gratitude by the decedent, rather than with disdain.
It likewise follows that such a decedent would not only want to stop any
such participant from being barred, but might wish to go as far as insuring a form of inheritance for that party.
As such, a rigid and automatic application of the slayer statute to
cases of assisted suicide fails to fully effectuate and comprehend the
likely wishes and intent of the testator. A forced application of the rule
would turn a worthy party in the eyes of the decedent into a barred
afterthought.
The second argument for why the slayer statute should not be automatically applied to cases of assisted suicide arises when examining the
public policy rationale behind the rule itself. As discussed previously,
the slayer statute derives from the commonly accepted notion that a
wrongdoer should not be able to benefit from his/her crimes. As applied to the slayer statute, a killer should not be able to participate in
criminal acts in order to gain rights and ownership in the property of the
victim of those acts. Underlying this common belief is the presumption
that the killer acted against the wishes of the decedent and committed
an act that society views as morally and criminally wrong. As discussed
previously in this section, the first presumption does not apply uniformly
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to instances of murder and assisted suicide alike. While a murdered decedent would likely look upon the killer with disdain or ill will, a decedent who has died as the result of an assisted suicide or mercy killing
would likely look upon the participating party who brought about such
result with gratitude. Similarly, the public policy rationale differs when
the focus shifts from murder to assisted suicide. While murder is commonly accepted as criminally punishable and morally reprehensible, assisted suicide has both proponents and opponents.
No matter which side of the assisted suicide argument one personally falls on, the realization that the criminal culpability of a participant
in such an act is up for more debate is undeniable. While our argument
by no means advocates that the slayer statute should never be applied in
assisted suicide cases, a rigid and automatic application of the slayer
statute to bar all such participants in every scenario effectuates a public
policy emphasis that is much too strong and turns a blind eye to the
realities and circumstances of the case at hand.
In order to cause automatic application, public policy derivatives
need to be uniform and applicable to all situations. Here, the public
policy condemnation of a killer benefiting from his crimes loses quite a
bit of strength when the factual circumstances shift from that of a murder to one of assisted suicide. Given such a shift, a rigid and automatic
application of the slayer statute to cases of assisted suicide seems even
more erroneous.
VIII. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO ARIZONA’S SLAYER STATUTE;
ARS SECTION 14-280397
Before discussing our proposed modifications to the language of
the slayer statute, it is first noteworthy to mention that in some states a
testator is expressly and statutorily allowed to provide in their will that a
person who kills the decedent may nevertheless inherit.98 While the
drafting and subsequent inclusion of such a provision certainly raises
some interesting ethical questions about a supervising attorney, the inclusion of a provision such as this also risks throwing the baby out with
the bath water. Not only would a participant in an assisted suicide to be
allowed to inherit, the inclusion of such a provision would allow even a
felonious and intentional killer of an unwilling decedent to inherit. So
while we ultimately still believe that including such a broad provision
should be allowed, we also believe that other statutory exceptions
should be made, whereby an individual who assists another to commit
suicide or participates in a mercy killing can nevertheless inherit, even in
97
98

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803 (1995) (West).
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 854.14(6)(b) (West 2002).
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the absence of an explicit clause or provision evidencing an intent to
override a slayer statute in the testator’s will.
Proposed Modifications to A.R.S. Section 14-2803:99
(A) A person who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent
forfeits all benefits under this chapter with respect to the decedent’s
estate, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted
spouse’s or child’s share, a homestead allowance, exempt property
and a family allowance. If the decedent died intestate, the decedent’s intestate estate passes as if the killer disclaimed that person’s
intestate share.
(B) Subsection (A) shall not apply if the decedent’s will expressly
provides that a person who kills the decedent may nevertheless inherit, and such provision is witnessed by three disinterested witnesses, none of whom is the killer.
(C) A person will not be deemed to have feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent under the terms of Subsection (A), and
thus will not forfeit any benefit under this chapter with respect to
the decedent’s estate, if such person proves by clear and convincing
evidence that either:
(1) the person’s actions or omissions consisted solely of assisting or facilitating the decedent’s suicide; or
(2) the person caused the decedent’s death, but such person’s
actions were performed at the request of the decedent and with
the intent to relieve the decedent from one of the following
conditions:
(a) a permanent vegetative state;
(b) a permanent and incurable illness or disease that is likely
to have caused the decedent’s death; or
(c) a permanent and irreversible illness or disease that renders
the decedent severely incapacitated or causes the decedent severe physical, physiological or psychological pain.
99 Our proposed modifications are merely suggestions and are intended to replace
the now existing Section A of A.R.S. § 14-2803. After insertion of our proposed
language, and its corresponding Sections A–E, the remaining portion of the now existing
B–L would be sequentially moved down and re-titled accordingly.
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(D) The exceptions provided in Subsection (C) shall not apply if
the party seeking to bar the person’s inheritance pursuant to Subsection (A) proves by clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) the decedent’s will expressly provides that a person who
kills the decedent shall not inherit;
(2) the decedent’s will expressly provides that a person who assists in or facilitates the decedent’s suicide shall not inherit; or
(3) the person intentionally used force, fraud, duress, deceit, or
misrepresentation to cause the decedent to commit suicide or to
request that the person kill the decedent.
(E) This section does not apply if the factual circumstances of the
decedent’s death lead the court to believe that the intent of the
decedent would best be carried out in another manner.
These proposed modifications encompass our suggested solution to
fix the current slayer statute and the problems that can arise from the
now existing version of the rule as applied to cases of assisted suicide or
mercy killings. Embodied in these modifications is the original language
of the rule itself, supplemented by three key additional components.
First, Section (B) provides a statutory means to allow a testator to
expressly override the slayer statute. And while, in our opinion, the inclusion of this express provision is not one that is likely to be used often,
we believe that it important enough to warrant existence. This addition
grants a testator full power in the disposition of their property, without
state interference, regardless of the testator’s cause of death.
Next, Section (C) provides the exceptions to Section (A) whereby a
person who would normally not be allowed to inherit because of that
Section’s general rule is allowed to prove that his/her actions meet the
statutory requirements for an assisted suicide or mercy killing circumstance. Section (D) then provides a method for those arguing that the
person shall nevertheless still not inherit due to either an express provision in the decedent’s will, or intentional wrongful action of the individual. Finally, Subsection (E) empowers the court, after a full
examination of the circumstances of the decedent’s death, to alter the
recipients of the property and the manner by which the property is disposed in order to best effectuate the intent of the decedent.
IX. CONCLUSION
No matter one’s stance on the morality and criminality of the issue
at large, there is no denying that assisted suicide is becoming a more
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common practice in American society. Due to this increasing trend, the
law can no longer stay silent on the issue nor try to fit cases of assisted
suicide within old laws and precedent. And while the realm of criminal
law will undoubtedly continue to make its feelings known on the subject, the law of succession can and must operate independently in order
to maintain the integrity its own goals and policies. This protection can
no longer come from broad statutes and general treatments. Nor can the
law of succession continue to treat assisted suicide as akin to murder.
This growing trend has peculiarities and motivations that warrant different treatment. As such, the slayer statute should not be rigidly and automatically applied to assisted suicide. Rather, modifications or revisions
need to be made to the slayer statute in order to rightfully accommodate
these cases and equitably refocus on the statute’s application to effectuating the true intent of the testator.

